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EXECU'rl VE SUMNARY 
PAR'!' A: Financial a.nnlysis- performance vet·sus forecast.: 
rn operat..ional t.erms BRAC has been very successrul during t.he flrsl 
21 monlhs of llDP Il and RCP. lll'tAC has reached or exceeded alJ of 
H.s major s~vings and c redlt. operHLionol Lorgel.s e:.ccpL for 
disbursements. 'l'he one concern wi Lh respect. Lo these a.chlevemenLb 
is in the area of loans ou l..s l.and i ng - Lhe qua llt y or these I oans is 
not all that it sho11ld be. 
In terms of financial forecasts, ROP 11 oveTall, ns of September 
30, 1991, was undorspent. relative 1 o tho• budget npproved last year 
by the oonors but was O\' erspent Ln it.s savings and credit 
acllviLies. 'l'he overrun in l.he savi n ~s and credit actlviL' relates 
almost. ent.lrely to an increase i 11 R<•volving J,ol\n l'und •·e<JHLremenL!;o. 
Loan ft.~nd requirements were 'fl~ 32 mllJ ion (37") over forecast. due 
primarily Lo Deep 'l'ube Well Jonnfi made during the last. q11arter of 
1990 and in the first quarter of 1991. 
lnteresl. ir~come on loans WI\S under fo1·ecast by 9%. This variance 
can only be expla1ned by utadequa t.e loan repayment performance. 
Other R.DP budget deviadons I operaLino,t expenses over. by 5" , 
cap1tal expenditures undet· by 6%) arc not. considered significant. 
RCP has reported profit in excess of Lu~gcL (13% over forecasL) due 
primarily to the fact 1.hat oper11t.lng costs arc still less than 
expected !16" under budget. \. InLerest. income l n RCP as irt ROP 
however, is not sufficient - only 14.6" on the average loans 
outstanding - not the 16% rE>l.urn or n well. pcrr.ornd ng t•ort.folio. 
This lowc t· l:hun expected return on the 1 onns j s the mos 1. seriou s 
threat Lo the viabilil)' of HCP ln l.he long rtln. 
The r eviewers l'ecommend Lhat. RRAC r•evise its RIW TI Revolving Loan 
Fund forecast lo provide for its platls Lo lnsLall Oeep Tube W~lls. 
ln aclcllt.ion lhny st.rongl :r rcoo1"mend l.lwl. 1'111AC' address t.he repayment. 
t>erformnnce of iL:o loun port.l'ollo ln 11 systemal,ic wa.y. 
Last. year's revle.w slal.ed LhaL URAC's loan c:.lasslfj.cation system 
:tlorlollsly masks repayment. f>!'obl e ms. This ls sl 'ill t.rue. There are 
clearly a signiflcanL number or loans which are classified as 
current whJch are nol paying properly. Some of Lhese are collecLive 
loans such as power LiJ let's and Deep 'l'ube Wells. lo/i.Lh Lhese 
coll ectl ve loans thet·e does nol seem t.o be n sl.rong sense of 
responsibility or ownership on the pnrL of l.he mnmbers for t.he 
asset. invo~ved or for Lhe debLs assoclat.ed w1Lh Lhern. 
Poorly performi.ng curr ent loazts in general are not receiving proper 
atlenLion from management or operaLino,t sLaff becvt1se Lhcse louns 
ure sllll assumed Lo be the beLt.er yuallt.y loans in Lhe porLfollo. 
PART Jl; l~xp<>ctat iops for !{OP !I and KCP; 
lt appears that BRAC will have sufficient funds from the donors' 
or:Lginal couunitments to complele ROP l! even t-liLh Lhe incrco.sed 
l'equiremenL [or funds for Deep 'l'ube Well loans. This conclusion ls 
based on what the reviewers consider rrasonable exchange rate 
expeclations. 
Fellow ing is a summary of Llle t·ev i seti re1111 i romen Ls and the l a Lest. 
estlmaLes of fwtds bvallalllc from Lhe donors: 
1990 1991 19~2 1993 Total 
(Tl; rnil Llon) 
Donor funds available: 
Oasc case forecast 438 670 538 263 1909 
+10% G70 :i82 281! 1976 
- lO% 670 ·195 238 
Esti mated r equirements: ( Tk tnill1on) 
RDP 310 286 000 9Hi 
HCP lti9 :l i t! 287 202 976 
Total requ.i red -188 628 573 202 1891 
The fundlng requirements for RCP have noL cloang~d . The model for 
RCP has been l;'CV~sed, howe,·er based o n octuaJ I nformul ion I' rom t.hc 
first 21 months of operation. BRAC l)lld tltt:> revict<cn< believe that 
RCP will coro~inue to be profJ~nblr an~ Lhol IL can absorb a number 
of downside scenarios DCCiliASe of the Stt'Ofl\l OflJ>l 1'1.11 iznt~on provided 
to ncr> by tbe donors (the nn,\C I oan l. 
PART C: New C[edtt rolicios: 
llllAC i n~iiatcd a number of net< cr<?diL t>o li cies Hi Junt:> J9!JJ. The 
most. conte11 t <nus of the policy changes is the one concerniug new 
loan classifications . 
ALl loans will be classified as of one or three types; 
general, collective or housing. General loans must be repaid 
within one year. The repaymen1. term for 1.he ot,hcr categories 
of loans wiLL relDain as before, nol exceeding 5 years. Hedium 
t.er-m i11dlvidual loans Jo~ns 1.0 l'"rchnse n cow o~ a 
rlckshuw, for eJoun}'le- will now have lobe repaid irt one year 
- berore they would havo haLl a Lwo or Lhree yetlr Lerm. 
DRAC has sLopped rn:lkinll medium term luum, u.vni lable l.o indh·idunls 
2. 
because Lhey feel thai. the repaymnnt terms wct'e too easy - that. as 
a consequence the bo~rowers did not Lake these obligations 
scr iously . By inc reasJ ng the I. ns t.a!men t acnoun t.s for asset loans 
BRAC feels l.J.ie borrowers will halre to n1ake a sacrifice in order to 
obLaio Lhe desired asset. . This URAC feels will improve discipline 
and repayment performance. 
A concern with respect. t.o t.his f.'01icy is Lhe possibility t.hnt many 
of BRAC 1 s members will no longPr be able Lo borl:'ow to purchase 
larger assets . If DRAC solves Lhe problen• of risky asset. lonns by 
elJml.nat.ing t.hem then Lhe borrowers will be Lht> losers. 
It is also possible that the larger individual loans will be more 
risky with a one year tern1 than they ~<ere 111ith a t~<o or three year 
repayment period. 
The reviewers recommend Lha.L BRAC mon.i.Lor Lhese sho1·t. Lerm assel 
loans carefully. Unt.il evidence proves Lhe conLra~y Lhese one yea~ 
asset loans should be conside red risky. 
WJ th <"espcct. l.o the ol.ht!r pol ic_y changes Lher·e ~Appear·s Lo be some 
inconsisl.enc)f in BRAC 1 s approuch. 13RAC has uL Lhe same Lime made 
the credit p1•ocess more I lexible and more constrained. 'rhe overal.l. 
vision of the process seems Lo be unclear wiLh respect to how much 
discreLion Lhe members and sLaff should have and how much should be 
defined by I lead Off ice. The new limj Ls ~mposed wit.h respect to 
household and member debL nppear 1.o be rather arbi trnry. ln 
addition they can't account for regional diversity and they w1ll 
have to be regularlY adjusl.ed for inflat~on or else w1ll restrict 
borrowing in the future. 
The t"evlewers recommend LhaL for Lhe Lime bc~ng DRAC quit chunglng 
policies that directly affect the borrowers' behaviour. rt is now 
time for BRAC to consolidate l.he changes made and more importantly 
to concentrat.e on its o"'n behavLOllt" and ln parttcular its 
monitoring and follow up of del 1 nquenl borrowers. At Lh:ls point in 
DRAC's development methodological changes are unlikely to have as 
much impact on loan quality as an improved monit.odn!l system. 
flART 0 'l' lto.> 1\renk o.>ven structu l"<' of B!lAC: 
On an operaLing basis BRAG's RCP is ureaking even now. UllAC's 
operaLing cosl.S In terms of loans oulsl.andlng is 14% p.u. An RCP 
office reqt1i res less Lhan 5000 borrowers lo break even on an 
operaLing basis each borrower having an average loan of 
approximately Tlt 2750. These break eveu condll.lons ure now be~ng 
met ~n the average RCP office. 
On a more r4lorous basis, call il. a m>.Lrket basis, • RCP is not 
breaking C\'en now nor is it ever liltely to. This is noL an issue of 
having or not having Lhe right. number of borro~<er~. Il is an issue 
of interesL r·nLes. BRAC -.ould huve to c harge l.JeL••eeq 20% and 30% 
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p.a. in order to break evert on a market bus1s. The fact that RCI''s 
operating costs are 1'1% p.a. and thuL borrowers pay only 16% on 
their loans nlcaru; that RGP's cost or funds rnust be no mot' e than 2% 
in order to break even. Whereas I% money does exist it can not be 
called market priced runcllng. 
RCP will still be able to break even on a subslcllzed basis because 
it has received funds at 0% from the donors. These free funds 
accomplish two things for DRAG - first ther lower RCP's financing 
costs Lo about 3% p.a., and second~y they allow RCP to earn extra 
income from investments. 
PAnT £; Hon.lLorlng; 
The reviewers' prla~ary concer-n wi t.h r-es-peel. to montt.orin'! ..-as Lhe 
control and improvement of loan tJUa~ i ty. BRAC if> not yet t.o t.he 
poinl. of having a monitoring system whic h can iden'Li fy loans Lhat. 
arc not. performing before they reac h Lerm. Two posj Live inl t.iaLives 
of the last year malte the attainment of such a system more feasible 
Lhan Jt was at this time lasL year; 
- a consultant. wil.h bank ;lnformation system e;o,.-peri.ence has 
been contracted to advise BRAC on the de~;ign of t.he necessary 
monitoring system from lhe boU..om up. 
- BRAC ha$ begun to collecl l.he baslc borrower repayment. 
so that in Lhe ful.vre staff w~ll be ab.le Lo analyze 
performance correcLly. 
data 
loan 
The most significant feature of the new process of data collcct1on 
is the fact that at base it dea.ls with each individual borrower. 
This was a recommendation of the previous review team. llRAC will 
soon be able to produce a statement. on each borrower. it will ue 
some Lime however before any useful data comes out. of the process 
because the computer systems st.Jll have to be desiMned Lo handle 
the data and the J:"C(>o.vts that Lhe daLu base wlU L>t"OVide are still 
t.o be deter~ed. 
It is ln this last area, repo~t design, with a parti cular emphasis 
on monitoring of the loan port.folio Qual•LY Lhac Lhe rev1ewers' 
recommendations are concentrated. 
In nddiLlon the reviewers recoruruend Lhal BUAC's RCP sLoff gain some 
analyt-ical experience boLh in loan quality evaluaLion ond iu the 
interpret.aLion of financial resulLs. 
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!?ART 1:: Long berm sust.ainability issues: 
The reviewers feel that BRAC has demonstruLed its operational and 
general mariagemcml. ability in t.he developmenL or Lhe Branch Office 
system of RCP. This is t.he rirsL pre-re<JUJsite to long Lerm 
viability. The reviewers also believe that l.he st.rong 
capitalization (once completed rro111 donors' grants) will protect. 
the operation from short term di rficult.ies lf Lhey arise while ORAC 
readjusLs iLs operation if necessary to avoid ~ny major changes in 
t.he bnsic business of lending Lo Lhe rural poor of Bangl:•dcsh. l~e 
l>clieve t.hat. DRAC will address the lssuo of l oan portfolio quality 
ln lts opernllon. There remaln " numbtn· of long Lerm issues st.lll 
be deall wllh howc>ver; 
- The donors have a right and an obllgat.lon uow Lo expecL BllAC 
to have a definit:.e policy for Lhe str\lCL\IrE' of RCP nfLer 1993, 
ln particular with respecL Lo Lhe proLecLion of Lhc snvers 
funds and l.he usc of Lhe !lRAC Loan. 
- RCP's proriL margin is very slim if it only charges 16% on 
its loans. It would not take m11ch Ln the way of cost. increases 
l.o significantly uarro>< Lhat margin fnrther. URAC's only 
defense in the long term Wo\lld be l.o cha.,ge more for its loans 
or to secure more low cost funding. 
- BRAC shonld diversify RCP's so1n·ces of funding from the two 
now nvn i.J al:!l e - donors aud members. 
The issues with l:'e!:ipecl to long term viabiltty facing Bl{AC are 
basically issues of financial structure and philosophy. 
There apr>ears to be an opport.unl ty in (.he curl:'enL pol i l.ical and 
economic enYironmenL Lo c:reaLe a privaLe secLor bank based on RCP. 
This is an opporlunit~· which may nol always be available. A 
regulated private sector commercial bank would go a long way 
towards answering the donor concerns and towards diversify\ ng 
fundi.ng so\lrces. The reviewal's' recomonenda~ion l!:i ~haL 13RAC proceed 
to create u ·privHI. e sect.or b<mlt ~>nd • nvesl ignt.c 11nmediute!y the 
var1ous l•!:iues oul.llned ln Part F or this report w1th respect to 
incorporation, eql.lity, othar sources o! debt, inter>est rates, etc . 
In concll.lsion the reviewers Ceet LhaL l~e concerns raised ln this 
summary and in the complel.e report are or.es which if responded to 
by DRAC will result in DRAC hecomtng one or 1.h~ most proresslonal 
and transparent t'Hral mlcro-credlt. J>rograrns in ·the world. DRAC is 
already one of Lhe most successfu l in Ol>erat.lona] and qualitative 
t..erms but. with more atl.entlon to lo.an qualiq· and a clear financial 
sln1clure for RCP it. can be t.hr. be~;t. inn rigoi'Olll> financial st-nse 
as well. There a •·e few other nd.cro-cred i L pro~ rams LhaL puss Lhe 
tesls that the reviewers are ex]>ectjng llRAC lo. It. is onl1' beca\lse 
1 t ls so good that I:. he revl ewers want DHAC Lo aim to be eve11 
better. 
s . 
PART A: QR,\C'S SAVINGS AND CRlmTT PEI1FORHANCE AT 21 HONTIIS 
A.l GeneraL: 
In the prepnrat.lon or this portion of the report the reviewers 
compared the actual performance of BRAC's RDP and RCP Iovings and 
credit activity over t.he last. 21 months wlLh ORAC's Largets E~d 
forecasts for the same act.ivitles. 
In addition to a review of Lhc operaling performance of RDP and RCP 
the flnanclal resulLs of Lhese Lwo pro~r.uns were also studied. 
J3RAO's quarterly financial reports as of September 31, 1991 were 
compared with funding requlremenLs budgeted for RDP II and wiLh the 
forecast balance sheet. and income s.t.atement of RCP. 
BRAC was asl<ed Lo produce tlie r1n~~.ncial l.)uugets t.o Se)JLeJnber 1991 
by the reviewer . The fact. t.hal quarterly budget.s are not. prepared 
as o matter of course is disappointing. Comparing actual quarte1"ly 
ElX!)enses lo t..ot..al annual budgets as ORAC does or• iLs reg1Llar 
report.s to t.he donors does noL lell anyone, leasL of all BRAC, how 
Lhe projec~s are progresslng. 
Recommendnlion: 
DRAC sliould as a mat.t.er of course prepare quarterly budget.s 
attd present. these ao; part. of il.s 'iJUarlerly act.ivil.y reports Lo 
t.he donors. 
This first section o{ the rev1ewer's report 1s highly analytical. 
Some l'enders m<:>y wish t.o skim t.he analytical, section . Tt. is 
provided primarily fo~- those in teres ted in the guant ita t i ve 
rationale for the conclusions and recommendations and doesn't make 
for brilJ.ianL t"eadin·g. 
Following this section of an-alysis is one of comments based on the 
an.al ys is (A. 3 l and then discussion or I, he l.wo major rind i ngs of t.he 
analysis - t, he lnr:ger: than cxvccl.cd rcqui rumcnL for loan funds 
l'ithin RDP ( 1\.4) and the apparent deterioration in the guality of 
BRAC's loan portfolio (A.5). 
A.2 AnalYsis - Operational and financial performance: 
Each of the Lables and graphs r:efet"rcd to in this and following 
sections of the report are contained in Appendix l. in the ot"der 
discussed. 
Table .1: 
Before reviewing the flnar\cinl performance of tho:> t>avlrqts and 
credlL act.ivllies wlthin RDP TI and RCP it lo; very important 
thAt the donors first. sLop Lo reflect on 14hal 1311AC has 
10. 
accomplished in the flrst 21 months of Lhese L1vo projects. 
Table 1. is a sumtna.ry of BllAG • s nchievcmt•n Ls to dale in RDP 
and RGP. 
BRAC has ma11a~ed to mee l. or exceed all of i l.S 2 I mon l.h 
opera t lng object! ves except dJ sbursemen Ls. 1'hese are major 
accomplishments consider lr1g (.hP scale and complexl Ly of the 
work involved. Wh•Levcr else Lhls report may conclude, no one 
can ' talcc from BRAG Lhc [{•ct. Lhal t.hpy have uouLled membership 
from 270,000 to 540,000 in Lhe period and Lhal Lhe number of 
villages where BRAG is now providing services to the poor has 
increased from 2667 l.o 4537 . The positive impact. thaL Lhese 
two programs are now havin!!: on Lhc lives of the approximately 
2. 5 mLLllon Bangladesh.i rural poor dj recLly affecl.ed is a 
testimony to BRAC's ability and molival.jon as well as to the 
donors' commitment and f11nding. 
The financial as1lects of what BRAG has accomplished in the sa,•ings 
and credit activities withln ROP and RCP are summar1zed in Tables 
2- 6 i n ~he atLached ApDend•x I. Table 2 deals w~Lh fundLn~ for 
RCP and RDP 11 ru11ounts originally expected from the donors, 
amounts received t.o date, budge Led amounts and amounts actually 
required by BRAC. Tables 3 and 4 deal with RDP and Tables 5 and 6 
summarize the financial aspects of RCP. 
Table 2: 
The first part of Table 2 shows the original commitment made 
by the donors to fund RDP 1 I and llCP (in 'raka at. the exchange 
rates applicable at the time:). For example it was or1g1nally 
estimated that the donors l<ould have provided Bfti\G with Tk '780 
million by September 1991. In fact they have prov1ded Tk 919 
million, 18): more than initially forecast. The donors have not. 
provided more than promised in terms of t heir own currenc1es 
noL- have they funded more rap1dly than forecast.. liather the 
increase in funds l~cce;ved by URAC can be explained almost 
completely due to a general devaluat;~.on 1n the Ta!w relat1ve 
to the donors' currencies. 
It. ls helpful to use the USS to i 11ust.rat.e how currencies ha\·e 
moved. The dollar has strengthened by almost 22% sihce Lhe 
proposals were agreed to (from Tk 31.7 Lo Tk 38.5 per dollar). 
Similar devaluations of Llie Tal<a with respect to the other 
currencies have also occurred wi l.h some slrengLhenlng more or 
less Lhan the dollar. 
The Tk 919 million received is m01'c Lhun liiRAO said it would 
need by September 1991 ( BRAC budget.ed t.o re<Juire 'l'k 880 
million). On Lhe other hand BRAC has used more Lhan iL said il 
••ould CTk 901 lllillion - an expense overrun of Tl< 21 million or 
2% to date). 
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Closer exarninat.ion reveals l.hal RDP II has underspent its 
budget and mosL of t.he excess funds received from Lhe donors 
wenl to RCP as inveslmehls. Tk 18 million h$5 been kept. wilhin 
RDP for use in the hear future. 
Tables 3 and 4 : 
Table 3 begins l.o prov~de more del.ail wiLh respect Lo where 
BRAC was over or under on i t.s funding requiremenLs wiLhJn ROP. 
The scope of Lhis review only covers it.ems A.3, A. I, A.5 and 
C ( which between them represent. 43" of IWP's <>xveose budget. 
and all of the income budget). Other revie•~ers will have lo 
determine wbat is happening t.o the ll.ems .-ltich are 
significantly off forecast such as item A.6.2- TARC's, A.6.3 
-REP and 9.2- Development. or Hural Managers. Out:. it. is 
significant l.o noL.e Lhal the major deVH>Lions from budget 
outside of savings and credit activities are ones of 
underspending. 1.f these othe•· activities at·e not actuallr 
under budget but. rat.her behind schedule they will be needing 
the excess funds that have been transferred ~o RCP for 
investn•ent. The 'l'k l8 million rE.>porl.ed by (lRAC as being held 
ln cash by RDP will not be E.'nough co fund the work wh1ch has 
not been completed - the TARC's, REP, etc . 
'!'he budget versus actual performance of t.he specific i terns 
within the RDP II budget relat1ng to savings and credit are 
summarized following. 
A. 3 Branch and Regional Office Opera Ling Expenses - 5% 
over budget: A review of i:hes" over- expendil.urcs re''eals 
no major issues of concern. '!'he overruns relate to 
charges due to other RDP programs, an under budgeting of 
travel expenses and the cosL~; resuJ Ling from Lhe early 
high turnover o1 female PO's. Two of l.hese causes are 
non-recurring and lhP t hi rrl I L•·avel budget. o\•erruns) wit l 
not t'le significant lty Lhe end or TI.DP ll. 
Host. BRAC of rices housP s ~a r f in <>xcess of those budge ted 
to savings and credit act.iviUes flfl."PE and other 
secLoral PO's for exan•Pl<'. The c-osts of housing and 
feeding Lhese ~;L.aff Hh011ld be paid rrom !.heir respect~ve 
budgets not from LhA operaLirtg cos~s of tht- offices. 
ApproxlmatPly 'I'K 2.5 mlll.ion of Lhe 'l'k 4.5 million excess 
is this type of cost wh ioh wii 1 be rec;overed by the RDP 
office operating budgel and re- allocated oo~rectly to 
other budgel.s. 
BRi\C beljeves Lh~l t.he cost. of hiring and lQs~ng a large 
portion of the female PO's is behind them now. This 
,J;"emains to be seen but. at laust BR,\C is still trying to 
increase the number of female I"O's despite the cost. 
involved. 
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BRAG mis-budgeted its Area Office ~cavel cos~s and will 
have to adjust its oLhe!" overations to compensat.e. In an~· 
case this error will he CO!"!"ected in Lhe RDP TIT budget 
and in the meant.ime «iJ l probably noL produce an over run 
on thls i Lem of much more than 2" - wh lrh is noL material 
in terms of the whole budget o t' RDP rr. 
A.4 Braroch, Regional office and Jlead Office capital 
investiDent - 6" under budget: Tloe under-expendi Lure here 
n::lulcs Lo nct.ivity which ls proceeding rather slower 
Lhan hoped. NeverLhPless flRAC has est.ablishPd, as shown 
on 'l'aul e I . , alJ. of Lhe Area 0 r f ices t hat i L had hoped to 
by now. Some a rae very recen I I 0 s i nee June, for 
example. This slower th11n hoped for staPL up of new 
offices has in the past been offsel by a more rapid than 
expected growl.h in VO's and membeTship. IL is expected 
Lhal the new of rices wi 1 1 con tl nue t.o reach levels or 
operation at le~s~ ~s high ~s ~hose forecast desp1~e the 
somewhat slower starl. 
The Tk 18 million Lhnt BRAC is holding in cash in RUP 
••hich ~;~hould be more ~htu~ enough to fund the completion 
oP the scheduled capilal investmenL activities. 
A. 5 Loan Revol v·i ng Fund - 20li\ over budge L: BRAC has 
required Tk l7.5 million p1ore than iL forecast Lo fund 
RDP's loans. This item woul.d have been Tk 32 mill1on lor 
37% l over· budge I but. ror un e:<tro I' I< ll) mi lllon in funds 
r .. ceivecl from Lb<.> F'or·cl F'oundat 1011. ( ny was of a c hecl;, Tk 
32 miJ.l ion is Lhe aruouut by which l.he loan port.fol1o ln 
ROP e:<ceeds ta~get (see table I.)). 
The fact. t..hat. funds re<lll ired for loans 
excess of forecast is a more important 
other budget items previously discussed. 
the explanation,; for t.his overrun 
implicat.ions for Lhe future performa.uce 
in RDP were in 
issue t.han the 
This ls because 
have serious 
of ttCP nnd RDP. 
There ., c-e only t.wo basJ c r·easons why BRAC woul.d end up 
with a loan portrollo h1gher Lhan forecast- e1ther they 
disbuc-scd more than anticipated or else they are 
receiving less bucl< ~hat plunned. The first explanation 
ls ouL since a.s mentioned a) ready disbursement..s are below 
forecast. Therefore we can concJud~ that tess pt'.Lncipal 
is being repaid than expected. 
'T'he1·e nt·e also only two ways 1.0 e~plain Lhe race thaL 
. prJ nc i paJ is being repa j d more slowly Lhan forecast -
ei Lher loans are be1ng made for a longer term than 
targeted or else the borrowers are noL repaying as they 
sholtld. '!'he J'lrst treutl had been observeu nl· Lhe Lime of 
last year's review and has conllnued sLrongly slnce. 
9. 
Tbe foUo~<ting summarj zes bo~< the sh! ft. in term has 
developed. 
Tel·m. st<uc ~ur·c; Short ~led i urn Long 
Budgeted 59% 3 7% 3% 
Total 
Total 
Term 
RDP 6 
RCP 6 
RDl' to June/91 72% 16% 12% 
RCP to June/91 6:1% 26% 11% 
This trend is even more st.r1king if t.hc 6 month period 
from January 1991 to June 199 1 is st.~mmarized. 
struct.ure; Short Medium [,eng 
month disbursements 69% 13" 17% 
month disbursements 27% 23% 26% 
It is clear that long term loans h~ve gained prominence 
nl the expense of n1edlum tern• ones. rhls is largely uue 
to the number of deep t.ubc well loans made ln Lhe lasL 
two years. This shlfL in Lerm is sufficient. lo explain a 
majo:r port-lou of t.hc increase jn t.he loans oulst.anding 
and Lhe need for more funds for l oans . 
At this point in the at1al ysi!;, i L ~<as not. cJear ~<heLlier an 
element of taLe or t>oor rep11ymenL was also l..o blame for 
a port ion of the larger Lhu11 fo rc~as L 1 oans ou Ls Landing 
fi~u1·e . An anaLysis of Llle int.erest. eurued by I{OP 
provided a ~amning clue Lo Ll1is effect.. 
C. NeL InLe~est lncome - 9% under budget: In that Lhe 
value of loans outstnnding in RDP haa held at or above 
forocast since January 1990 (see '!'able •l - .1 terns sho•dng 
outstanding loans; at various ti.mes and Crapb 1 . l it would 
be logicul t.o expect. that income from these loans "'Old d 
ulso be above forecast. The fact. thaL il is below 
forecast implies strongly that something is wrong with 
repayments. 
The int.orest income for boLh RDP and RCP are less Lhnn 
rare-cast in absoJut.e t.erma but nlore criLicolly, also as 
a percent of average loans outstnnding. This means Lhat 
a.lthough BRAC is chai,glng Lhe borl"owers 16% on its loans, 
due to poor repnyment. BRAC i.s rec:eivlng smne\.hing less. 
\0. 
RDP' s gross loan port fol• o since ,Janllary l, 1990 has 
developed as shown in Graph 1, a relatively straight line 
progression. The average nul loans outstanding for Lhe 9 
month period has been ca l culated at Tk 194 million. At 
the 16% p.a. interest. charged lhe borrowers DRAC should 
have earned Tlc 23 . 2 million frorn Januar~ Lo September but 
ln fact earned Tk 21.6 million in Interest lncom~ forth~ 
same period. This represents a ral.e of return on the 
loans o f only 14.9% p.a., not the 16% p.a. forecast. 
net loans !n RDP: 
at .Januan I, 1991 1'k 14 6 m.ill ion 
at Sepl.e rn ber 30, 1991 Tl> 242 rn illion 
Since Llle borrowers ~ay interest and principal together 
in Lheir I'(lgular instalments, l f interest. received is low 
then iL is reason~ble l.o concl ude that vrincipal 
repaymen L is also I flss l han ex pee l.(ld. Th.Ls was our 
suspicion carl iet· and «L I hi:, point wc began La become 
concern•cl· 
Tables 5 and 6: 
Table 5 shO\<S the budgeL vs. acl.uol b(dance sheet Cot· RCP und 
Table 6 the cornpa rat i ve income s t..a Lement . 
The major balance s t.eeL devial.lons are Lhe followin~: 
J,nvest.ment.s- 27% over budget:.: lnvcsUncn ts is higher than 
expected because sources of funds ( dcposi ts and the BRAC 
loan) are higher than forecast aud the uses (loans and 
fixed assets) are lowe~. 
Net Loans - 3% under bud !lot: Although net loans are lower 
a1. September 30 thun forecast lust year's performance 
indicates Lhal by lhe end or t.he ycur !oans out::;tanding 
will be above budget. The l!l r·owth w Lhe loan porLfallo at 
the end of last yea,. wus par·Lly seasonu,l and ptu·tly due 
~o the Derp Tube Well loans made between November end 
February. Graph 2 sho><s how Lhe RCP loan l)ot·t..folio has 
marc or less matched forecast to date. 
It is i nteresting to remember thHt at this time laJ:il year 
there was concern as to whelher ftCP would reach ltcs 
forecast l oan port.rotlo values. At Lhu~ Lime Lhere were 
only 10 Area Offices in RCP and these had started out 
wi Lh lower than oplimal l~vels of loans outstanding. 
Graph 3. shows Lhal by Lhe end of the yeaP 1990 these 
offices had in fact not only reached thelr own revised 
lower ta;·get. for loan l~vels but had attained the general 
forecast. as weLl. It is Utt.Lllcely LhaL Lhe issue of 
II. 
H.dequate loan portfolto values will be a RIBJOr concern 
eit.he" in RCP or ROP for the fot"esecablu fut.ul"e. 
Fixed assets - 15" under budget: These astwts arE' below 
forecast primunly b<>cuuse of lhe lower than forecast 
needs at Heud Office level. Head Offtce will have to 
start spending for fkCilities shortly and Lhis ~hortfall 
will be eliminated. There is more thun enougl1 funding for 
~his capltal expansion when IL occurs wi.lhin the 
investment. uccounl.. 
Men1bers sav ini(>J ar~d I( roup Lax - 13" over !Judge t.: ~lcmbers' 
savings exceed lnal I:W t hl"cause llRAC inc 1 mlc» Lite 5" ro reed 
savings component. pi us tht> I'P'JUl r:-etl 1'1< 2/wt'ek ln i,.hla 
category. Only 1'k 2.•1/week was budgeLetl. Croup t.ax 
nmounl.s are low becn11&e l.o this point dioburseonent." are 
low and group "uv1ntts are 1% of disbur .. ement.s. ~luch of 
this shortfall in gro•tt> savings will he plckPd ••I' later 
in the year but in nny case l.ot.nl deJ>Osil!< will still be 
over budget. at year end. 
llRAC loan- 9" over bud!let: The loa.1 from UI!AC is in fnct 
the donors' fundl:l pa>~sed t.hro\ogh BRAC to RCP ul no cost • . 
The loun is Tk 36 million above forecast. becuuse ORAC has 
received Tk 5& million more Lhan ROI' could liSe. This 
excess except fol' Tk 18 mi 11 ion h1~s been pn.ssed on to 
IWP. It cou l d be l.hat. ROT' \oli ll need some of the excess 
back when the programs in ROP ~hat oppcar to be behind 
schedule cnLch up. 
The major features of the 1ncome statement t.hal bear 
mentioning are the following: 
Loan interest inco•e - 9" under budget: ORAC earned only 
14.6" p.a. on its average net loans out.sLandJng in RCP 
for the first 9 months or 1991. Last ycnr the same 
calculation yielded >d ight.ly in excess of the 16" p.a. We 
can only conclude thnl. there bas been n worsening of 
inl.eresl payment f>errnrmrlnce since Sepl,.embcr of last 
year. 
In tere" 1:. on do[>Os I ts - 2 7" over budget: Til is cos l ls 
higher than forecast ~ocuu~c lhe level of d•pusiLs wAs 
h.i.gher, both ut. Llot> lJcglnning of Lhe year and at 
September 30. As lnl.t>re,;t. income declines from 16" p.a. 
to something lowor due Lo qoonllly problema nr1d Ll•e cost 
of funds increases ns a result of hlgher levels of 
deposits RCP's net inLeresl. incom~ w1ll be squeezed. The 
issue of interebt rate policy is discussed 1n Part F. of 
this report. 
Operating expenses - 16" under budget.: As wus l.he c ase 
last year at this lim<' operal.ing cos~s nre st.ill under 
12. 
budget. The Head Off1cc operating costs are st1ll lower 
than forecast and dcprec1ution expen .. es arc also low 
relating primarily Lo delayed staffin~ and capilal 
expenditure at the Head Office level. 
Of all of l.hc RCP budget. vs. actual comparisons the lower than 
forecast interest. income issue, bet'ause or the quality 
implications, involved is Lhe most serlous. 
A. 3 Gene raJ com1uen t s C rom the 1111nl vs is: 
BRAC has received Tk 55 million more from Lh~ donors Lhan reguired 
to date for RDP ll and RCP due t.o C'Xchan!!le rat.e ~atns. IIRAC has 
passed Tk 37 million or l.his on to RCP for use as investment funds 
and kepi. Tk 18 mlllion in RDP in ca~h. 
RDP as a whole is under-spent rclat1ve to budget. Other revie~ers 
will have to determine how well BRAC has been able to accomplish 
l.he objectives of l.he ol.her activities within RDP ll bul. t.he 
s avings and credit. actlvil.ies huve meL all the targeted oujecLives 
except for disbursemcnl.s. The saving;, and c red1L acl.1vities arc 
over b\1dge1., however primal'i ly because of a larger than anticipated 
requirement foc funus [OJ' louns. In (.hal. some activlt.!es in RDP are 
behind schedule RCP may have t..o return a port..ion of t..he excess 
received from RDP. 
'rhere have been v. numbur of deviations from torccnst ~<ithin the 
savings and credi l acll vi t.ie~> of RDP but the over run on the 
Rcvolvint,l Loan Fund and t.ho below target int..ere::~t.. Jncome on t.he 
loan s outstanding are the only issues of concern. 
RCP is performing well. Profits arc over forecast due Lo the fact. 
that operating expenses cont1nue under budget.. RCP i,. not earning 
Sllfficient. income on 1ta loans however nnd net i11LerPst i11come is 
being sqo1eezed as the cost of savin~s rises. 
A.1 Loan fund reyyircmc11t.M: 
Based on l.he pat.t.ern of t.he past year and the results t.o dnl..e RDP 
IT will need more funds for it.s loan portfolio l.hun prcv1.ously 
forecasl.ed. ROP' s loan porLfol io is now Tl1 32 rn1 ll1on over forecast 
and BRAC estimates thai. Tk 60 mt llion more than forcco.sl. will be 
required frono now unLil li'le end of 1992. Tho tolul loan fund 
overrun by the end of RDP 11 1s therefore likely Lobe 1o Lhc cange 
of Tk 90 mill1on. Graph •l dlust.ratces this rev l,;od view of RDP's 
future loans outstanding situation. 'l'tus revised forecast. for the 
growth of RDP's loan portfolio has been included In the latcsL RDP 
l1 budget and compared to the current estlA.at.c of Lhe funding 
available from the donors. ThiR exercise is described in Part B of 
tid" report. 
I'?>. 
A.5 Loan porlfolio qualilx in rmP and RCP: 
The major problem in l.rying to describe whal is going on in DRAC' s 
lending is the fact. t.haL l.here ~s st.ill not. a useful way lo 
directly measure repayment. performance. BRAC con linues lo use 
current , 1aLe, overdue and noL yeL transferred as Lhe categories 
Cor raLing Lhe portfolio quality. Our concern now, as in Lhe pas~ , 
is Lhe fact. LhaL this grouping .ignores L.he non-(lerforming loans 
whic h are in Lhe currenL category. The reviewers are aware, for 
example, LhaL l..here are a number of loans for Deep Tube \~ell s .-hich 
are classified as current which are noL paying. 
As slated earlier we have be~n 1~ad by a series of deductions Lo 
conclude t.hat BRAG's loan po1·1.foli.o quality has, aL besL, 
deteriorated s.ince the Last revie,,. The inLeresL raLe LesL 
described in Lhe analysis sec Lion doe!> no l. tell us where the 
problems ex.isL - iL merely says that the borrowers are noL paying 
inLeresL as Lhey should. 
It is noL lhe interest rat.o test alone which lead us to conclude 
that repayments are not as good us e»pectod . In addition to the 
recovery rate wh,i,ch is almost useless as a measure or quality BRAC 
has inLroduced anot..her indicetor of loan <J.l,lal.i.tr that seems to 
support our e»pression of concern. As or January 1990 BRAC began 
forecasl.ing Lhe monthly r'ealutat.lons ~instalments duo) tor each 
office and collecting the actual resu1ts as a comparison . Graphs 
5 and 6. show how Lhese ~wo numbers hove varied s&nce the beginning 
of the year. 
Average Realization Rat.e vs Target 
(9roonths, 1!191) 
RCP 77'!1. 
RDP 87" 
ToLul 82% 
Whereas there is still some debate possible concerning the 
definitions used by BRAC in the calculation o f Lhe reall<!;ation 
targets there can be no argurnenL wiLh Lhe stalement LbaL however 
reali.zatl.ons are defined the borrowers u•·e behind i.n paying them. 
The few observuLions LhaL can be made aL this Lime concerning the 
loan quality bast<d on BRAC' s reporling sysLem are Lncluded in the 
Appendi~ 2. prior to Tables 8 ~o II . 
WhaL else can be said at th.is Lime other ~han loan repayment. is not 
••s good as it shou~d be? We lack Lhe st.aList:.ics Lobe more precise. 
'l'he reasons for the poor repaymenL are u.ndoubLedly ,·aried buL are 
more a matter of opinion than analysjs. 
The reviewers' opinions, to be added Lo BRAC's own views and Lht 
impressions of olhcr infonned comment.ators on these issues, ar.:: 
of Cered follo'd ng: 
14. 
- t.be schemes: 
Ther e is a t.remendous interest. on Lhe part of DRAC in 
making Deep Tube Well loans. At ~resent DRAC believes 
Lhat.. 2/3 of the wel ls in operation are profitable . 
(Pr ot'it abl e is still a ra t he r subjective term) . There o.re 
now 309 DTW's in opernLlon o.nd deut o.ssociaLed 1dt..h Lhem 
is in the range of Tk 50 million or upproximul.ely lO% of 
t.he loans ou t.standi11g. 
BRAC proposes Lo make e.not.her· Tk 200 million in DTW loans 
(operating and cavlt.al) before Lhe end of 1992 and an 
additional Tk 90 mlllion wort.h in 1993. This is t:learly 
BRAC's major SLt'al.egic Lhrusl. for loan schemes over the 
next. few years. 
- I.. he borrower!< : 
Ther e does not appear to a si..;ong se nse of responsibility 
o n the part of the borrowet':; for the collective loans or 
the assets financed by l.l1em . IL appears as if these loans 
were o nes which BRAC wan Led t.o nlake and wh Lch as a 
consequence t.he borrowers don'L feel obligated to repay. 
Collective schemes which arc not. work1ng do not. inspire 
borrowars to r~pay . 
'fhe small groups do not seem to be very i mportant to the 
memb~rs . Some groups do noL appear to be very strong. The 
small group leaders do not actively collecL the 
instalments due and don't seem to bake a real leadersh i p 
role. 
Peer pressure can worlt agains L BRAC i r Lhe members see 
some people not paying and suffering no consequences ns 
a rasult.. Nou- paymen\. C<Ln snowball in such f.L slt..uat.ion . 
- the lending staff: 
Tbe PO ' s are aware of who is not paying, in particular on 
the collective loans, but. do not seem t.o )(now what.. to do 
about it. They are wait1ng for !lend Off i ce instruction 
but Head Office muy nol. realize how serious the 
siLu nLion is because of Lbe loan classlfic~Llon system . 
Many of t.he non-performing loans are sLill classified as 
current.. 
Tile PO's do not. seem Lo enforce any consequences with 
delinquent bor rowers. In theory DRAO shoul d suspend all 
leudlng to Lhe group members if one is in deraull. 'rhis 
doesn't. seern to act.ually happen. 13RAC doesn ' t ever take 
the borrowers' savings or the group funds to .repar loans. 
It appear s that a borrower loses nothing by not paying. 
This is hardly an incentive ror the good borrowers. 
IS. 
It couLd be tn~t Lhere is too much emphasis on 
disbursements and not enough on recovery. BRAC may need 
" clear incenLive and pena.lty pollcy to encourage Area 
Office and Branch Office staff to increase loans 
outstanding and decrease late and delinquent payments. 
- BRAC management: 
BRAC's emphasis at the senior levels seems to be 
expansion and not. quallly of lending . DRAC senior starr 
should focus more aLlenLion on inlernal policies related 
1.o irnprovin~ and controlllng loan quality . 
Wi Lh res peel; to the DTW J oans Lhe IO'e docs not. appear to be 
a clear connect i on between the profitability of the well 
and the repayment of the l oans . DRAC monitors the first 
but noL the second. Profits apparenl..ly earned by the good 
Tube Wells are noL auLornatically applied to the debt 
outstanding. There should be an improved co- ordination 
between the monitoring of the economics of the schemes 
and the loan repayment performance associated with Lhem. 
Whereas iL is noL clear whul Lhe ouusc of Lhe payrnenl pro~lems nrc 
what is clear js thaL BRAG musL bugln Lo gel conLrol of Lhis issue. 
The sltun~ion ls fnr from dcspnratP anti Lhere is no need for the 
donors lo pan~c bul BRAO musL show some serious progress in this 
area shorlly. 
The reviewe1·s' reconunendaLion wi r.h respecL to how t.o go about 
gett.ing on Lop of lhis issue are conlalned Ln ParL E. 1..he 
recommendations are in Parl E because as we have said before we 
believe that the secret. or a good repaymenL record is first good 
monitoring. 
'"· 
PART B THE PI10SPECTS FOH RDP ANP nee 
B. l Donor funds available: 
1990 1991 1992 1993 TOTAL 
(Tk million) 
AKF/CIDA 0 91.6 123 123 337.6 
DAN IDA 78.8 37.8 4:! 30 189.6 
EZE 25.2 50.3 38 0 1l3.5 
FF 3.6 3.6 II 4 1-1 • 8 
NORAD 30.0 37.8 36 33 136.6 
NOVIB 1-11.0 163.8 loiS 25 477.8 
ODA 126.8 190.3 108 16 440.7 
SIOA 32.5 94.3 ~ 33 L98.3 
TOTALS 437.9 [i69.5 539 263 1908.9 
+10% .. .. 582 :!88 1976 
-10% .. " -195 238 1841 
As the above table summarizes the base case forecasl for donor 
funds is Tk 1909 million by the end of 1993. The base case used the 
exchange rates currently app1 icab,l.e to the various donor 
currencies. A 10% general streng then,ing or weakening of the donor 
currencies relatJ.ve to the Taka would result in a variation of t.he 
1'unds available of + or - ai:)Gut Tk 70 million. 
The same process of using the then currenL exchange rates appLied 
last. year underestimated the amount. of Talta funding available to 
BRAC as the Taka fell generally relative to the donors' currencies 
after November 1990. 'rhere is no particular reason to expect the 
Taka to strengthen over the next year or t.wo. rhe base forecast is 
considered a conservative one for the nexl two years. 
B.2 BRAC's regui.remPnts for funds in IWP IT.: 
BRAC' s revised funding reqturements includ1ng an anticipated 
increase in loan funds required due to Deep Tube Welt loans and an 
observed trend t.o a largel' number of borrowers in each Area Office 
are shown in the Appendix as Budget l. The only change from the 
budget. approved last. year is t.ht' increase in lLem VIII - Loan Fund 
Requirement. - by Tk 90 mllllon, Tk 30 million in 1991 and Tk 60 
mill ion in 1992. 
Estimaled requlrement.s: 
FtDP 
RCP 
to tal requ i red 
1990 
319 
~69 
•188 
1 991 
310 
318 
628 
1992 
286 
287 
573 
1993 
202 
202 
Tot.al 
915 
976 
l89l 
17. 
BRAC re<;~uested approval for an increase in the total budget for RDP 
I I la5t year from Tit 678 to Tit !128 mUlion , That increase w0 s an 
opportunistic one which allowed I.IRAC to revert to its ortgiual plan 
with respect: to the plaltne(l openi.ng of' new Areu Offices. The 
request was prompted by t.he observed increase in Taltn funding 
available. 
This year BRAG is again reques~ing upprovnl fot· a .-evision in 1 ts 
RDP II budget.. - and again believes that. t..he Increase can be funded 
from anLicipaLed gains in Lhe exchange rale. 
There are Lwo issues wilh respect Lo the forecasts prepared by BHhC 
for Lhe lasl year of RDP II: 
1. This review did not consider l<hat. has been happening in l.he 
areas of RDP II other Lhan savings and credit. The mid Lerm 
review mil>sion will have Lo del.erml.roe whel.l\er lhe olher 
acti v l ~ ies are on target or not. and whether BRAC will be able 
to complete then• with l:.he now forecast. funding avaiLable. 
2. 1lRAC has not. been very accuraLe so far al. predicLing l.he 
amount. of funding required for Joans. This Is a very difficult 
exercise and whereas BRAC is bccomir•K more exp~r·ienceJ at Lhe 
process we musL consider· what. would happe11 of t..his most. recent 
forecast. ls significanLly orr. 
lf the requirem~nt for loan funds turns out to be less than 
forecast BRAC would h11ve a s11rph1s at. l.he end o! RDP II 
(assuming the other acLivit.ics remain within budget). This is 
noL considered Loo set"ious and the disposlLion of Lhe funds if 
any could be discussed with lhe funders of RDP III. 
If RDP II requires more funds in 1992 l.han forecasL BRAC has 
a number of options: 
- it could slow the lending nct.ivity down either before 
or af~r the end of RDP tt, 
i L could 
complete l.he 
shortfall in 
til, or 
borrow funds from banl1s or· from RCP 
disbursemenLs in RDP IT and lhen 1nclude 
its request for funds frorn the donot"s ~n 
lo 
the 
RDP 
it could temporarily use members' funds for loans 
wit..hin RDP. 
The donors should be pt"epared to accept all of these options 
except the last one should BRAC have to come up with more 
tunds for loaus . The cosls of {tny oVel""run shoultl be born by 
BRAC and not Lhe donors ln Lhis case. 
te. 
slay wltltln Lbe rorecu~l r·c<Julr·c11rcnls !"or run<ls unll thut lf 
DltAC can't i.t:. hul:> l!Jc cupublllly t..o man{lgc ll.s options. 'rhe 
loan fund rcquircmerrt..s should be monit..oreJ carefully however, 
in ·parl.icular prior Lo Lh<> end l)f J 992 n:;. a ne•• round of DTW 
lo>tns are planned at. I haL t.l mc . 
BRAC' s forecasts with res pee t to the remaining fund i.ng t'O<JUi rements 
for the sav~ngs and credi.t aclivi. Lies of IWP I1 and RCP are 
cons idered reasonable as is the assumption that the exchange rate 
will not strengthen genero.JJy r'clui.Lve l.o tht> donors curr-encies. 
19fl0 1991 1992 1993 Tot.al 
Donor funds avuil<lblc: 
base case fo r'<'Cas t. ·I 38 670 538 2133 1909 
Esti rn!ICI?d re<Juirernon ts: 
RDP 319 310 286 000 915 
RCP 169 318 2B7 202 976 
Lo t..:d. roq11i.c-ed H!B fi28 Eo7J 202 1891 
Hccomror?nclat1on: 
The donors should ncce'j>l. HrtAC I" revised RDI' lT budget. 
lndicating an increased requ..iromen l. !'or funds of Tk 90 m.illion 
over t.hc budget appcoved .Ln 1990. 
13. 3 1')10 (;! t"OS:Q<'C b; for f'ICP: 
A numbc1· of c lrungos have been made ln ~he model fo•· f'ICP. Tn g<-neJ•a] 
the J"cvlsions were made t.o accommodate trenrls which a f ter 21 mont.hs 
of c-xpl..'rience have been Been i .o differ signJ flc11nt.ly from est.imat.es 
previously made. OLher chan~cs were ma~c Lo correcL error& ln Lhc 
model ouly •·ecent ly dlscovcl"od . 
- Lhe p1rrchase price of fixed assels hRR been increased for 
Lhose branches Ld bP N••rchased afLer 1992 from RDP - from Tk 
0.95 million/branch lo Tk I .54 mlllion/hranah. 
- ~he n\unuer of borrowers per brRIICh leu· Area Ofrlcc) has been 
increased as follows: 
year 1 : h·om 6()0 to 7jl() 
year 2 : from H OO l.o 1800 
year 3; from 2400 t.o 3000 
year I: f £'0UI 3400 to •1000 
yeur 5: from 4000 to 5000 
year 6: from 1\000 t.o 5500 
- savings has been changed 
2/person/weelc (from 80% of 
savings component 
from 1'1; 2. 4 /pet•son/weel< 
the members) plus a 5% 
to Tli 
forced 
-the schedule for Lhe ~urchase of ROP's Area Offices h~s ben 
revised as follows: 
1995: from 10 to 20 
1996; from 10 to 20 
1997: same 
1998; from 25 to 30 
1999: from 30 to 35 
2000: from 30 to 40 
2001: from 30 to 40 
2002: from 50 to 0 
The total purchased is still 300 AI'CHl Offices from 1990 to 
2002. 
- The requiremenl Cor Peep Tube Well loans in 1991 and 1992 
has been incorporaLed lnlo Lhe revised mCJdel as well. 
With the above changes lncorporuLed UUAC has prevarcd whal is now 
the new base case for RCP, nLtached as BudgeL 2. in Append b. 1. 
A number of sensitivity cases were run on lhe uew base case: 
1. loan lnLerest senslLlv!Ly: 
The model was run using loan inLeresl of 14%, 18% and 20%. The 
14% case is relevant because Lhis shows whal will happen Lo 
RCP unless BRAC can improve ils return on loans ouLstunding 
from •~ha L it now appears to be. 1\ t. 1.1" RCP beg ins loJ> i ng money 
in 1997 and never again becomes profitable . Obviously the 18% 
and 20% scenarios are more posiLive thrtn t he base case . The 
20% sc~nario is useful because Gromecn hns just revised iLs 
loan rate t.o 20% nnd ARAC sho11ld serjousl~ consider folto~o~ing 
this lead. 
2 . deposit volume sensitivity: 
The impac i. of a 20% inc.rea!>e und a 20% decrease J.n total 
savings was tested. 'The model indicates lhal more savings are 
better than fewer. 'rhe less savihgs lhat. RCP has the less 
invest.ments there are. Since investments pay more than the 
cost of deposits Lhis is not s~rprlsing. 
3 . loans outsLanding sensitivity: 
If 1 oans 011 l.s La r\d i ng for wha Lever reason decrease by 20% from 
forecast. RCP wlll incur losses for the period 2000 to 2008 but 
then recover. 
20· 
In all of the negative sensit1v1t.y cases except the 1~" loan 
interest case RCP was able to continue to operate, in other words 
after a J)eriod of losses profi tabll ity was r:-e-established. The 
conclusions from Lhls exercise are Lhe following' 
due to the strong capitalization and 
economics or RCP Lhe program shou l d be able 
number of possible long term deviations 
performanc<:, 
the underlying 
to w lthstand a 
from forecast 
the most serious LhreaL Lo Lhe long Lerm viabilJLy of RCP is 
a d<:cline in inLeresl rates on loans. 
Recoon mendatlon: 
That. t.he donors acce1)L t.he revi sed ba.sc case for llCP and t..haL 
this case be used, un.Less furthel' revised, to noeasure the 
performance of RCP unti 1 Lhe period of donor funding is 
compleLed. 
2.1 . 
PART C !.IRAC' S RJ:±VISED PilED 1 'C POL [C [ li:S 
C.l General: 
A number of changes have been lnLroduced ~n J3RAC's credit policies 
since Lhe review in November L990. These new changes were 
officially in place by June of th~s year buL many had begun Lo be 
instituted in an unofficial way starLing in April of 1991. 
Each of the credit pol~cy changes implemented by BRAC was 
introduced to correct a problem in the credit operation - a problem 
identified either by llRAC or by outside rcv1ewers. Before one is 
inclined to provide cautionary or negative commen~s w1th respect to 
these changes it is lmportan t to qnderstand BRAC' s reasoning in 
each case. 
0, 2 The proble-ms observed and DRAC' s reaction: 
1. Classification of loans: 
All lol•ns will be classified as of one of Lhrce Lypes; 
general , collective or housing. General loans musL be repaid 
!'iLhln one year. 'fhe repayment. Lc-rm for the other categories 
of loans will remain as before , noL exceeding 5 years. Nedium 
Lcrm indivldual loans loans Lo purchase a cow or a 
rickshaw, for example - wlll now have to be repaid in one year 
- before lhey t<ould have had a two or Lhree year term. 
BRAC has de te rnlined that I:. here is a J)rob1ern with Lhe Lr medium 
term loans. Borrowers wer·e Pound lo be ret,a:.o.lng according to 
schedule fo.- lhe firsl year of Lhe loan bul thereafLer their 
pay men Ls ~<ould become i !'regular. Since most or these loans 
initially demonstrated good repayment performance this problem 
was assessed to be a lack of willingness rather Lhan a lack of 
ability to pay on the part of the borrower - in olher words an 
atl:.i tude problem and not an econom]c one. The exLended paymenL 
scheduJ.e previously avai table W"HS consi.dcr·etl loo easy and ab 
a result was not l..aken sedously by t.he borrowers. 
The amounl. of follow-up required Lo collecl paymenLs on these 
medium t..errn loans resulLed in them being more e-xpensive to 
provide Lhan short Lerm loam;. ~1on1Lo r l n!:( of medium term 
loans was noL effective aL catch ing t>oor rep,.ymenl. because 
these loans would on1y be re-classified from current to late 
or overdue once Lheit· original t.er1n lrad expired, often after 
one or two years or poor payment hisLory. 
To counter the perce;i.ved slacl( bo;!hav1our;- of the borrowers, to 
reduce the operating costs to BRAC of asset loans and to 
provide for a rnore Llmely moni Loring of these loans, BRAC 
initiated Lhe new classlf1cation volley. QRAC feels t.hat if a 
borrower wants t;.o obtarn a major· asset. like a co~< or a 
22. 
rickshaw then he or she must n1ake a serious commitment and be 
willing to make sacrifices to repay the higher lnst.alments 
resulting from a shorter loan Ler~L By forcing Lhem Lo repay 
in one year the borrower wiJ I have Lo more carefully assess 
his or her ability to repay the loan t.han before. 
2. Loan ceilings: 
Loan siees are now controlled only hy ceilings related t.o the 
number of loans previously received. 'l'he policy now is t.hat a 
borrower's first. loan can not. cxc"eed 'l'k 3500 , l.he second 'rk 
5000 and Lhc thlrd Tk 7000. Previously each loan purpose had 
a limit (the maximum loan nvuilable LO purchase a cow used Lo 
be Tk 5000, for exa~ple). 
BRAC observed LhaL many borr•ower!i were obLain lng loans wLLh 
one staLed purpose and uslng Lhern for aoqLher. They were o1'ten 
forced into this dishonest behaviour because Lhe limiLs set 
for each activity were too lo1~. For exa111ple 1 if a loorr·ower 
wanted to be involved in small trading bul. required a certain 
amount of money in exces& of t.he lunit. available for Lradlng, 
he oT she might.. apply for a cow loan s Lnce this type o e loan 
had a higher lirnll. . 
It. ~o•as dLfflculL fqr BRAC to consLant..i) review and revl.se the 
loan limits for each LY()e of ac"tlvity tbal the borrowers wE<re 
involved in. There were regional variations in ~be costs [or 
the goods and services that members mighL want 1.0 borrow for 
as well and BRAC had t..o Lry l.o accommodate ~hese differences 
in it..s loan limjt..s. 
The change is expecl.ed t.o slmpJ iry Lhe loan appt'oval process 
and to make t.he c redit anal)•si s at. all le••els more realistic. 
BRAC and the group m"GmbeTS wilt len ow w)'la t. t.he borrower l nt..ends 
to do wi lh the funds because there l s now no reason to 
misrepresent Lhe purpose of l.he l<•<•n. 
3. Borrowers per household: 
The max:lmum number of mombers (and consequently, borrowers) 
per household has been limited to t;wo . There was no l1mit. 
before. In addition the mnx:imum amount of loans that one 
household can receive from nRAC is set at Tk 10,000. 
Previously the limit was Tk 14,000. 
DRAC had observed t..hat often more than two members of one 
,family l<ould be VO members and would take out. loans and ~<ould 
benefit from other BRAC services CNFPE in parLieular). As a 
resull. ot' thjs conceneration some families benefitted at -che 
expense of other needy persons. BRAC wlshes to spread ~he 
benefits of il.s services more widely. Dy limiLin~ Lhe 
membership in one family Lo Lwo persons it. was felt that Lhe 
services would be more witlely dlstribuLcd. 
l n Bangladeshi villages t.he basic economic unit is the 
household nol. a. parl.lcular income eraning aot~vity. Fu.nds are 
moved freely from soLtrces to uses within the household 
depending on the current opportunit~es and needs. Since it is 
the income of the household as a whole that determines debt 
cupacily SRAC thought it prudent. to reduce the amount of debt 
available Lo that household. 
4 . Number of loans per borrower: 
The maximum number of loans t hat. one borrower may have at any 
one time is lwo. In other words a member can parlici.pate in 
only two schemes at a time. This is a nPw restricLion. 
In order to keep borrowers from r.xceeding their debt CnJ)acity 
and also Lo simplify Lhe reco~d keeping involved in recording 
and reporl.ing on Lhe loans oulsLnnding t.hl.s Ulensure was 
lnlroduct'd. 
li . Advance pay uoen L : 
No <ldVIlnCc p(lymen ls will be td lowed unle~;s the whole loan is 
repald at. once. T 1' a borl'ower repay~; all at once he or she 
will root be eli.gi ble fo:r a new loan until I. he scheduled 
expiration of the completed loan. 
9RACI<tll> cxperiencin!! a problem managing it.s c ash flow because 
of irre"'ular loan repaymcnt.s. 'Borrowers would oft.en repay more 
than one instaln1ent on a loan nl a Llme. Tlol~; would usually 
occur wi t.h a borrowel' who on oLhet• occasions would miss a 
payment. or Lwo. The Area Office would end up with either more 
cash than anticipated and have t.o make an ex~ra trip to lbe 
nearest bank Lo deposLl the excess, or else a casl• shortage, 
and again ha,·e to travel tq t.he bank j n order to be able to 
fund disbursements. 
ln order to impose more discJpl iue 011 t.he bor!"owers und t.o 
malta cash management in each office more accurate DRAC is 
reqtLi ring borrowers to s L icl, Lo Lhe repa;o<men t sc hec;iul e that 
they agreed to. 
This policy w,ill also red1.1cec the j,lOssibil~ty of a borrower too 
qu~okly obtHining a Large loan. Before i l was poss1ble to take 
a loan for a short pe.riod, repay it and then get o larr,:e•· one 
immediately . 
C .3 Implications and impact of the changes: 
DaLn is not yet available t.o assess how Lhe changes previousl~· 
described have impacted the borrowers. Tn fact it is not at all 
certairo that BRAG currently has Lhe information system necessary to 
be able Lo produce data which would allow Lhem t.o analyze the 
impact of the changes. The tollowiu~ commer~~s t.herefore are not 
guanLita~ive but rather guali~ative. 
1. Re: 'rhe term structure or t.he portfoLio: 
There wil~ be a shl fL to Lhe shart.er term lat~ns as a result at' 
the new class~rtcutian. Medium term indiv~dual loans w1ll be 
pnased out over the neJ.t two li> tht'ee years. The portion or 
the total port folio in medi urn Lerm Loans will de eli ne 
signi ficanLly. 
The funding impact of th~s is that loans will tul:'n aver more 
quicldy and loarl portfolio out.sl.anding will be lower than 
would otherwise have occurred. Thls trend will help to o!fset 
the previously discussed shift to longer term loans for Deep 
Tube Well purchases and will to some exl.ent reduce the total 
forecasl Revolving T.oun Funrl requirement of RDP II. BHAG will 
have La carefully review lts whole loan portfolio term 
distribution while preparln~C RDP llT' s l;nrdgct. as o resul L of 
these two co•peltng trends. 
2. Re: The borrowers' activiLlcs: 
AlLbaugh BRAC mlght not iut.end lo discout·age bcrro~YE'rs from 
Laking Lhe larger loans, wh!c:.h are generally for assets, this 
ls in fact what. mlghl hapven. In lhE' field slaff were saying 
lhal. more people ar-e laking out small trading loans, for 
examp_le and fe1-1e c for c ows, r· icksh<tws, e lc. as n result. of the 
policy change. 
3. Re: The risk strucl.ure of the loan portfolio: 
There are two cornpe ling fac t,ors invo 1 ved here. T f prev.iousl~ 
mediwu l.errn lndl.vidual loans were poor quallt.y Lhe loan 
portfolio will lmpr:ove as t.hcse loans are phased oul. If 
hawevc r, L he same number of 1 a rge loans are rnflde but for 
shorler Lerrus lhen there is a possibi.lil.y that tbe guality 
will not. improve al all but jn f11ct deteriorate. If Cor 
example, ~· borrower could not rer•ilY a loan "lth lnsl.a.Lmen\.s of 
Tk tO/week then ht> or she wil.l htwe great difCicull.ies 
repaying Tk 30/week. 
C.3 Comments and recommendations: 
The firsL general conce~n with respec~ 1.o these changes ~elates to 
how BRAC was able to first idenlify the medium term loans as a 
problem and secondly to determine thllt the iss\oe was one of 
attitude and not economics. Based on this reviewer's experience 
with BR.AC's monit.oring irrforrnal.lon i L is not. <tl all. cert.ain that 
management had adequate data on th respect to the performance of the 
medium term individual loans in order to assess l.he ·problem. If as 
a result of a lack of good data BRAG has misunderstood the medium 
term loan situation it is very unlikely Lhal the situation will be 
improved by Lhc changes irnpl <1meul.crl. 
2.5. 
The second general comment. wns raised earlier concern]ng lhe 
possibil ily that BRAC' s members wi l l not be able to borrow to 
purchase larger assets ns a rcsul t of Lhe cnanges. In this 
reviewer's opinion it may be ral.hcr 1 ike Lhrowing the baby ont wi th 
the bal.h water. If BRAC solves the problem of risky assel. loans by 
eliminal.ing lhem then the borrowers will be Lhe losers. 
This would be a shame as Lhese types of loans are \.he ones whlch, 
if adminlstered correctly, will acl.ually increase Lhe wealth of the 
borrowers mosl. rapidly. 
In addition to these two general concerns Lhe ~c nre a number of 
spocJ. fie ones which may be useful t:.o BRAC and t.he donors. 
1. Classification of loans: 
It was i rnpor tant to Lhe rev 1 e••e rs 1 as L yen r Lha 1.. DRAC a dd t' e!ls 
t..he unl<nown pet'formance of ROn\e of iL& larger indi,· i dual 
loans. DRAC has done this and determined t.hat. there i. s i, facl 
a problem. They have further decided t.hat. l..he root cause is 
one of borrower at.t.Jtude nol . economics. 
The obvious conc~tn here is t.hat the new loan instalments 
required to c•epay a l a··~~ I oan OV<'t a term of only one year 
may be too high for the borrower to handle. ny stressing the 
borrower's attitude toward these debts has the economics of 
the loan suffered? Only time wlll t.el1 .r Lhe problem was one 
of attitude or economics and whether Lhc action l.aken was Lhe 
right. one but good moni l.orl ng would help in answering this 
question. 
Reconune nda L ton 
As sl.n1.ed elsewhere, BRAC should Jni LJaLe a monitoring 
approach which ooncenl.raLes on Lhe higher r .lsk loans. Unlil 
evidence proves l.he conl.rary these larger one year loans 
should be considered risky. The new reporting system should 
identify loans over a cert.uin disburlolemcnt. II.RIOunt (perhaps Tk 
5000) and track the.Lr repayu1enl. performance closely on a 
u1onLhly basis. 
2, 3 and ol. Loan cellJ.ngs, borrowers per household and number 
or loans per borrower: 
There nppears La be some l.ncons!stenoy on Lhese issues. On t.he 
one hand BRAC has removed some standardization in its credit 
policies in favour of a mot·c flexible •~pproa-ch wil.h respect Lo 
loan amounLs for different purposes bul on Lhe other hand it 
has imposed new 1 imits and r-educed ol:.hers with respect Lo 
borrower debL. The nuw limiLs appear to be rather arbitrary, 
they don't. account for regional diversity and they will hnve 
l.o be regularly adjust.ed for inflaLion or else wlll restrict 
borrowing in the fuLure. 
26. 
It seems as if BRAC ' s credit policies are becomin~ a biL of a 
patchwork affai r. Any lender has to strike a balance between 
standardization and flexibility but it is not clear that BRAC 
h as a consistent vision of where Lhat balance should be. It is 
possible Lo slandardize t he process of loan evaluation without 
having a standard definition of what an individual's or 
hot1sehold's debt capacity is . 
Recommendation 
8RAC s hould consider carrying out a review of its c r edit 
pol icies and its ~ethods of t raini ng cr.edit officers wi th a 
view to det.er~ining the proper balan ce be tween standard 
c r ite r ia and standard methods of analyzi ng loan appl ications . 
The credit decision process s hould b e clearl y described for 
the lending officers in the form or a ct~ediL manual which 
slates ho w the econoud cs of t.he loan is to be assessed. IJow to 
assess debt service ca~acity is a skill that can be 
standardized and taught. 
5. Advance payment.: 
The requirement that borrowers stick to the repayment schedule 
as enrorced by this new po~icy is consistent wilh decisions 
made last year . As intended this change IDiiY Ill so assist the 
Areli Office !lccounlanl to manage Lhe cash position . There is 
no reason to argue with this change if borrower discipline is 
considered to be i mportant . This reviewer thinks that borrower 
discipline is eAtremely important and t hat any action "hich 
enforces discipline is useru~. 
6 . Oeneral comone n L wi Lh ~res peeL Lo c hanges: 
Making chang~h al Lhe oper.Liny level or an organization as 
large as anAC ls very dlrriculL. A great deal of staff time 
and effort musL be spent informing Lhe members or Lhe changes. 
Even mol'e Lime .ls reCJuired to ensut"e that these new policies 
a~:e understood and adhered to. Where as BRAC is to be commended 
for iLs willingness t.o make Lhe efforL Lo revise iLs policies 
lt has perhaps tinke.red enough wiLh how (,he borrowers are to 
behave. 
BRAC h as i mplemented a number of policy changes that direcLly 
affect t he borrowers in Lbe lasL 2 - 3 years. It mt•Y be that 
the number of changes implemented and rate at which BlL\C has 
been imposing them has created confusion in the minds and 
aLtitudes of Lhe borrowers. BRAC should p~obably leave those 
policies LhaL directly af f ecL t.he bo~rowers alone for a Li me 
in order to be able to assess Lh<! impac t or lhe changes 
already made and also Lo concentL'ate on policies and 
procedures within Lhe organizaLion iLself . 
27. 
Borrowers are rernu.;r lcably b.imllar where,·er ~hey are . Man~ 
differenL meLhodologics lnwe been Lried in various part.s of 
Lhe world wiLh varying degrees of success. One consLanL or 
good lending progra11n; regardless of Lhe melhodo.logy used, 
however, is Lhe existence of a good monJLorLng program 
combined wiLh a sLrict pol i cy of follow up on Lh e ~art of the 
lender i n the case of delinquen t payment. This is the area 
that this reviewer feels shouLd now receive most of BRAC's 
management attention . 
2B. 
PART D BREAK EVEN STRUCTURE OF BRAC 
D. l General: 
The concept of break even analysis is quite simple al first glance. 
Break even occurs when costs and income are equal. The conditions 
that exist at that time are break even condiLions. The probl em in 
DRAC's case, as in most break even analy>ds si Lua l ions, i'!l t.hal. not. 
every one wlll agree as Lo which costs should be included and ••hich 
income i Len1s should be seL etJUill Lo Lhem. Wj Lhout wan Ling Lo over-
compli en l.e Lhe exercise bu L wishing Lo deal ndequa te ly w i Lh the 
subJect il. probably necessary Lo loolc at least. Lhree dlfferenl 
Lypes of break even ror BRAC; 
1. Loan interest income only compared to operating expenses 
only: 
This could be called operaLiog break even and Is often 
what some commenl.aLors mean when discussing break even. 
In BRAC's cuse t.he condiLions reyulred f.or:- operating 
break even have already be~n reached by RCP. 
2. Loan interest. ~ncorne only coq1par·ed Lo operat-ing plus 
financial costs: 
This is a more rigorous Lest of Lhe viabillLY or a lender 
and could be C!i>lled real world or market breu.k eyeo. 
There are no operating conditions foreseeable under which 
BRAC will ever attain this level of break even -as long 
as it. con tinues l.o charge 16" p.a. on its loans. 
3. Loan interest. incoule plus l nvesLment interest income 
compared Lo operating costs plus lower lhan marke l. financial 
costs: 
This could be call<'d a wubsidizcd br<?ak eVE'n analysis 
since in iL we do noL expect income lo cover all cosLs, 
and in addition, l.here is source of jncome other than 
loan interest income which is funded aL less Lhan marl<et. 
rates. BRAC's RCP hu.s Lhts l<1nd of structure. The 
s u bs:idized structu •·e fo 1· RCI' was designed beca11oe J L has 
be!'n ~ssumed t.hal. lendIng Lo t..hl' landless poo•- of 
Bangladesh can not. be done on a pure market bas1s. 
0.2 Operatlng break even analysis: 
For thE' 13 mont.hs ~o J u ne 30, 1991 RCP' s operaLi 1\!1 costs for 30 At'ea 
Offices (including loBn loss provislon) totalled Tk 15.6 million 
which is equal to 14% ~ . a. of che average loan portfolio 
outstanding during Lhat period. 
2.~. 
Whereas 1.he total operaL1ng costs for RCP Hill continue to cl1mb 1n 
absolute terms they are Utl-llkely to ever be higher than 14% of the 
loan portfolio. The logic here is that the overhead or fixed oosts 
of running RCP (bead office and regional off1.ce expenses) are 
highest at the beglnnlng as a percontagc of operating costs. In 
addllion average loan porLJol io per office within RCI> is still 
gro'-'ing in real terms "•hllc ope<"aLing cost.s have more oc less 
peaked. 
Therefore as long as RCP earns at least 1·1% on its loans it ~<ill be 
able to b'reak e\'en on an operat.ing basis. BRAC is charging 16% on 
loans and therefore should always be able t.o cover the Olierating 
costs of RCP with interest charged the borrowers. 
To determine how many bot·rowcTs or . loRns lH'e required to pt·oduce 
income equal to t.he opcral.ing cosLs of one Area OfCLce we can again 
conscrvaLlvely assume Lhal llCP 1dll never be any more efficient 
Lhan lt is now and furl.her assume l.ha~ one RCP office will have to 
produce orte thirtieth of l.he t.ot.al curt:"ent ~equired break even 
income. The income LhaL one office will have Lo produce in one year 
is; 
Tk l5.600.000 ~ 2 ~ Tk J ,040,000 
30 
In order Lo receive Tk 1,040,000 from a loan portfolio chBt:"ging 16~ 
p. a. regui res that the ofii.ce have an avet:"age value of loans 
outstanding over the year of Tk 6 1 500,000. Thls ls the operat.ing 
break even loan portfolio fat:" one office. 
There are an infinite number of combtnaLions or average loan sJ~e 
and number of borrowers whlch would :.rield the brealt even loan 
porLfolio - everything from one bot:"rower with a one year Joan fo, 
Tk 13 million to 13 million borrowers each with a one year Tk 1 
loan. If we assume that either l.he loan amount is fixed at the 
current average value in RCP ('J'k 2750) or '\.hat. t.he number or 
bot:"rowers is rixed at the current average for an RCP branch CiiOOO 
borrowers) the results are as follows: 
Operating break even conditions for RCP per Area Office; 
borrowers required (loan of Tk 2750) 
average loan required (5000 borrowers) 
= 025 
= Tl< 2600 
The fact that the breaJt evan conditions i o both cases at·e equal to 
or less than the current averages found in RCP just. confirms what. 
we already concluded- that RCP js covo.ring i~s oper'a.Ling cosl.s. 
:.o. 
0.3 ~arkeL break even analysis: 
Opera1.ing costs 1 0% - 1>1% p.a. or average loaus outstanding 
Financial costs 
(incl . inflation l 9% - 14% " " " " 
Profit 1% - 2% " " " 
,, 
Required income to 
cover costs 20% - 30% p . a . of average loans 0/S 
'!'he operat..ing cosls we have <>lready said wi ll not exceed 14% p.a. 
BRAO forecasts thal at RCP ' s mosl efficient.. this cost. will •·educe 
to approximat.ely 10% p . a. 
BRAC is currently paying 9% p.a. for its deposit.s but deposit.s 
represent only 1/3 of the funding currenLly required for Lhe loans. 
BRAC is not. paying anyt..hing for t.he other 2/3 of the funds and so 
is no~-> paying on aver-age only 3% p . a . to fund TICP's loans. 'rhis is 
hardly a market. s ll..uaLlon . When ORAC borrows from banlcs in 
Bangladesh it pays 16% like evel:"yone else. llJlAC's real world cost 
of financing therefore would ran\(e from A minimum or 9% (if funded 
completely by deposits) Lq at lea;.t 14% ( 1/3 deposits and 2/3 banJt 
debt). 
The reviewc•·s have assumed ~hal 91 is Lbe maximum raLe of inflaLlon 
in Bangladesh ie. LhaL at. a ra1.e of 9% on deposi ~s l.he savers are 
alleast maintaining lhe valu.e of ~heit· asset.s. The required chnrge 
l.o Lhe borrowers Lo cover inf la~ ion cosL~ Llterefore is included in 
t.he financin!:{ c:os1.. of l.he lender. 
II RCP was a comme rcial pr i vate sect.or bank i l. would ha\•e ~o charge 
an additional 1% - 2% Lo provide a return to l Ls shareholders. 1% -
2% on loan$ wo1•ld provide somelh ing in l. he range oF 15% reLurn on 
equiLy which is no~ an llfll"easonaule ~argc.L r·eLurn for ~his ld nd of 
enLerpris~ in lhls eCOitOmf. 
If pressed to say what rate does RC!' require now to brealt even the 
worsL case wquld have to apply - 30% p.a. rr all goes well - if 
deposits develop as forecast and operating costs decl.1ne RCP might 
in the ftrture be able to break even charging 20%. 
BR,\C will never be able to trLtl y break even on a marke1: or real 
world basis charging 16% p . n . 
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D.4 Subsidized break even analYsis: 
RCP's actual income sheet is as follows: 
6 mon~h operat1ng l'"esults 
(Tk million) 
Loan interest income: 
minus: cost of funds: 
Net interest income: 
Ot.her income ( ln-vestments): 
rrd nus: opera t.lng cos Ls: 
Net income: 
I 5. 9 
I 3. 2 l 
12.7 
. 7. 2 
( 15 0 6) 
4.3 
per cent 
of loans 0/S 
14 % p.a. 
{ 3 %) 
11 
" 
6 
" 
(H %) 
3 
" 
RCP's lnl.ercsl income should be 16% of neL louns out~;Landing. F'or 
quality related issues as already discussed t.hJ.s jncome is below 
forecusL. However, even 1f int.t.•resl lncome was at the required 
level the following is clear: 
- RCP would not. br.,ak even wi t.hout. a lower t.han market. raLe of 
Lnlereat. on ita funds and wil.hout. l.he income from its 
investments. 
This is not. news to anyone familiar wlt.h Lhis project. but. pel'"h<Lps 
Lhis analysis makes the 1ssues clearer. 
At different times .i.n the forecast. peefonnance of RGP t.he 
components or income and expenses vary as a% of total costs. Based 
on t.he current.ly n~p~oved budgoL for RCP Lho following summarizes 
the most profitable and loasl profiLuble forecast. years for RCP: 
Mosl profitable forecusL year - 1996 
12 month operating results per cent 
(Tk mllllOO) of loans 0/S 
Loan interest. inoome: 210 16 
"' 
p.a. 
rn i nus: cost or funds: (130) ( 5 %) 
Nt>t. inLorosL i OCOJrtO: !50 11 
" 
Ollter income ( inves Lment,s): 57 5 
" 
minus: operating costs: {137) ( 10 %) 
NeL income: 80 6 
" 
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LeusL profilable forecast year - 2002 
12 month operating ..-esults per cent 
(Tk million) of loans 0/S 
Loan inLerest i "con1e: 561 16 
" 
p.a, 
minus: cost of funds: ( 2 I 0) ( 6 %) 
Net. interest income: 351 10 'K. 
Other income (investments): 54 2% 
minus: operating costs: 1306) I 10 %) 
Net. income: 39 2 
" 
The polnt. in comparing TtCP's best. fo..-ecast. year wit.h it.s least 
profll.able ls to again em1>hasi2e Lhe relaLive im[Jort.ance of t.he 
various componenLs of income and cost.. ROP does l<ell in 1996 
because investment Income is l1igl1 and operating cosLs are low. 
Conversely RCP earns lts lowest. profit. (or comes closest. Lo not. 
breaking even) when that invcsLmcnL incomn fulls. Tnveslmenl income 
ls forecast t.o fall ln 2002 l,I(~CRUS(> 50 AreH Offices 1dl1 be 
purchased from RDP in LhaL year aucl Lhe funds t.o purchase Lhem wiJJ 
come from Lhe inveslmenL account.. 
PART E MONITORING 
El.l Gcn~ntl: 
The reviewers' primlucy concecn wit.h t•cspect. lo IlRAC's monit.ot•ing 
syst.ems and procedures is t.he con~rol and impt·ove~ent. of loan 
qualit.y. Thel:'e are other relevant. and import.ant. features of a good 
monit.oring system but based on previous conclusions the area of 
loan repayment performance is t.he one which for t..he tJ,me being 
requires t.he great..est. at..Lent..iQn. 
E.2 Progress made since last. rear's review: 
Unforlunat.ely BRAC sliil does not have a simple way of measur1ng 
and report.ing the qualiLy of t..he Joan port.follO· As discussed in 
Part.. B the loan quality categories now used do not place proper 
emphasis on ~he current loans which are not performing adequately. 
Some of the recommendations made last year on bhls &ssue have been 
implemented but others have not. What. hr•s been accomplished leads 
\IS ·to believe tha L (.he (·emu i ning recomn•nndo. t..j ons will follow. 
- a consuLtant with bank informu~jon system experience has 
been contracted to "dvise llltAC on the desi)Jn or the neces,.ary 
monitoring system from Lhe bottom up. 
- anAC has begun to collec~ lhe baedc borro••er L"epayrnenL data 
required so that in Lhe future slafr wlll be uble to ltnalr2e 
loan performance correctly. Thls duta is conta i n ed on a new 
Collection Sheel !Jrepared by the CS 's and mon1tored by the 
PO's. 
The most significant feature of the new process of data co llect1on 
is the fact that at base it deals with each individual borrower. 
This was a bas1c recommendation of the previous review team. DRAC 
will soon be able to produce r1 sLntemenl on each borrower. Thls is 
the first st.ep to getting cbJ1Lt·ol ove•· Lhc l endlng opcra~ion. IL 
w1ll be some time ho••ever before any useful data comes out of the 
process because the computer systems still have to be designed to 
handle the data and the ropor t~ tha 1. t.he data base w i 11 provide at·o 
still to be determiued. 
There is a co nee r·n •d th t..he new collec Lion Shee-Ls, however and t.ha l 
~elu Les Lo Lhe amount of rosponsiblliLy placed on the GS's and the 
potential for error lnvolved In t..he process as Information is 
transCerred for each borrower each noonLit from one sheeL to another. 
BRAG is aware of the voLenLial probleJIIS uuL Lhese Lwo aspects o f 
Lhe new forons •Hll have Lo be walched carefully. 
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E. 3 What nt~eds ~o be done: 
BRAC needs to produce rnports which will be useful to the PO's, the 
Branch ~lanagers and the ot.her management staff in a timely and 
acc\trate manner and even mot:e importantly which identify areas of 
poor repayment before the tet:m of the loan expires. 
Recommenclalion: 
Tbe r:-cviewers recommend the creation or n process of loan 
guality monitoring based on the cepuyment performance of each 
loan r:-egardlcss of the term of the loan. The process will 
build on the data cont!Uned in Lhc new CoLlection Sheets as 
outlined foLlowing: 
1. Area Office or Branch Office loan quati LY reporLs: 
Every.borrower who is noL up to date with repayments should be 
placed on a ''Oelinquent. Dor:-rower List"' at the end o f every 
month. This list should be organized by VO and shou 1 d be 
prepared in the Area or Branc h Office with a copy sent LO tl>e 
Regional Office. The loan scheme should be noted on this list 
as should the amount of principal (including interest 
capitalized) outs~anding al Lhc monlh end on each loan as well 
as t.he PO responsible. Each month Lhe Branch or 1\rea n1anager 
sho•1l.d organize Lhe PO's Lo carry out. a campaign target.ed at. 
these borrowers and should enforce the remedies available: 
- no loans Lo Lhe other me1nberb of t hat. small group (or 
VO if possible) until Lhe delinquents have repaid, 
Laking of me mbers ' savings or !:roup funds 
delinquent loans nrc not repaid or at. leasl 
schedule wit.hin a prC!-det.ermined number of 
cycles , 
if the 
back on 
payment 
- e~pul s-Lon rrom membership of t.hc delinqucnt.s. If access 
to credit. is a valued service to ~he DRAC members then 
t.he LhrcaL of cuLtlng off that access has t.o be a real 
Lhreat. that. BRAC is prepared Lo Implement.. 
This is a mojor tasl1 and may absorb n good deal of branch and 
area offic"' staff time to the exclusiorL of new disbursemenr.s. 
This is an intentional consequence of havi ng u poorly 
performing loan portfolio- le nding s hould slow or even stop 
unt.il the repayments arc bac~ on ~chedulc or Lhe poor payers 
are eliminated. 
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2. Reglottal and Head office reports: 
'l'he regional and head office rnanagemenL should Lrack Lhe loan 
repayment performance of Lhe branches <tnd urc .. oF rices based 
on lhe "Delinquent borrower li»l.s"'. 'l'h!!se lisl.s shou l d be 
J'url.her organized (either al RO or HO dep<bncllng on Lhe 
availabiliLy o r contpuLera) such LhaL Lhc amounL of principul 
outstanding aL each monLh end can be sumtnarizet.l as follows: 
Principal 0/S showing on time repa~~ent 
Principal 0/S showing 1-3 payments in 1.1rrears 
Principal 0/S showing •1-1 0 paymen l.s in arrears 
Principal 0/S showing 10+ payments i n arrears 
The second step at t.he RO or HO ts to assigf'l prod SlOns 
againsl income and accumulat.e reserves against gross loan 
values for e ... ch office. 'l'he 1n ·ovision>; will var.v ror each 
category or repayment. perCorn1ance, 1e 0" for on t1me repayment 
~·P to l 00% for acknowledged d i sas Lers. These ca tego L" ies and 
the levels of provisions ure only suggestions at this time but 
Lhe process must be initiat.ed with lhe recommended logic and 
on some simila1· rational basis. 
BRAC should write off the worst loans. Provisions are t..alcen 
from income and used to •·educe Lhc value of the Joan portfolio 
for the specific reason of being used Lo absorb wl"'ite-of fs. 
This has been recommended before and was going Lobe done b\>L 
as yel has not been. The wriLe-off experience will help BRAC 
determine what is a realistic way or esLimul.ing provisions. 
The 2% of disb1>rsemenLs may no1. be real i sl.ic - t..oo much for 
the good oCflces and rlol enough ror l.he poor ones. 
Still using the di.\La fro nt Ute "deli nguertl. bon·ower lisL" Lhe 
RO nnd HO C!trt begin Lo do more deLI\iled analysis of the loan 
puymenL )>er f orntance based on a range or claas! Ficat.ions - type 
or »churne, or location or lo~n size or what.eve•· - Lo begIn to 
beLLe•· understand where I he probl etns are . Once manttgemenl 
understands where l:.he problems ut•e then l.ltey cun begin to 
formulaLc general strategies that will aim lo reduce sysl.con 
w.ide risks. the specit'ic rnonit.od)lg of D'l'W loun» or bhort. t..eC"on 
large assel loans \.Je comc~> feasible wll h Lhe proposed sy~;tem 
and a true unclcrsl.arld i ng or lhe mftgnl Lude of Lhe problems can 
be finally arrived at. . 
In addition l.o Lhe above recommended loan quality reporli.ng system 
or one llke j t the revie"!ers believe that BHAC 11t:.eds more f1uancia l 
analysis cxpeC"ience in house. BRAC should be able to say whal its 
problems are with respect to loan repuyme.nt or C inancHtl st.1·ucture. 
This is a new discipline ror the monitoring and management starr of 
BRAG and is noL u skill lhut. can be leurucd without outside 
assistance. 
Recommend~' t ion: 
The r eviewers recommend that BRAC 's RCP st.af r gain some 
analyt.ical experience bot.h in loan qualit.y evaluation and in 
the interpretation of fi nundal results. This will likely 
r~quire staff to take spcciuli~ed Lraining in financial 
analysis, perhaps outside of Bangladesh. 
?:i1. 
PART F: I,ONC TERM SUSTAJ NAill L 1'Y t SSUES 
The reviewers have conc~uded 1~ hat. DRAC is well on .ll..s way in RCP to 
becoming a s~osl..auu•ble ent.it.y. 'fh 1 s conclusion i.s based on a number 
or observations; 
- BRAC has demonstrated i t.s ope cat ional and gene cal management. 
ability in the development of the Branch Office system of RCP. 
The abi 1 i Ly t.o d<>vel 01) and aperaLe a significant number of 
offices in different. regions of the counLry is a necessary 
pre- r equisite to utl..alning a size whel·e cconomles of scalr;- can 
reduce operating cos ts. As yet these r<>ductions have nnl.. 
star ted but it. is reasonabl e to conclude Lhu L Lhe opP rating 
costs are nL l..heir highest. now and will decline us t.he real 
value of the loan porLfollo of l..he branches increases while 
sl..affing does not. 
- Lhe various scenarios LhaL have been run on Lhe model for 
RCP and Lhe nLLainmenL by DRAC or the overallonal LargeLs 
leads us to believe ~h1<L fuLua·e performance wi 11 be more or 
l ess on Lha foracasL. 
- as long ns Lhc donors cou t. i nue Lo mee L Lhelr conond l.men ts t.o 
RCP there will be u strong capiLall~a Llon whlch will proLect. 
Lhe operation from short Lerm difficulLles. 
- BRAC has demonsLrat.ecl 1 Ls abil i Ly to adapt to situations and 
will undoubtedly have Lo do cxact..ly that in the future. The 
problem wit.h a model ls LlouL .lL Lends t.o have assumpLi.ons 
built in that. do not. allow for the compensaLing c<tpability of 
Lhe instiLutlon. WiLhln BRAC that capability is very 
significant and must not be t'orgo1.Len ~n any atlempt to 
forecast !;.he nabilit.y ot RCP. 
Not\"ithst.andlng t..he above comments there remain a number of issues 
••hie!) still have to be dealt. with, however; 
llRAC must. ser1ous!y begin to address the issue of loun 
quality . The sensitivity analysis confirmed that an average 
return of only 14% on the loans outstanding is not sufficient 
Lo allow RCP to continue operating and to be self-sufficient.. 
- The role of the donors -Ln the Sli\)CI'vision oC RCP will be 
less effective after the funding Lo RCP has been comple~ed. 
The donors realize that they will not have dlrccL influence 
over RCP after 1993. Consequently no.-, while t.hey still can, 
they are pressuPing DRAC to defi.ne the regulai.OI')" slrucLtlre of 
RCP and to clarify t.he uses of the members' funds and the BRAC 
loan. The donors have a right and a responsl bi 11 ty Lo do 
exactly LhaL aL this Lime. 
'2>6. 
- BRAG is vulnerable due to its relatively high operaLing cost 
structure and the current. practise of charging only 1 G% I-'• a. 
on iLs loans. BRAG's costs , par-LiCillarly sala!'les, may rise 
due to pressure from compeling i nslituLlons or as a resulL of 
general inflationary trends E1 nd tbli? viability of RCP would be 
LhreaLened as a r•esul L, BRAC' s only de rense in lhe long term 
would be Lo charge more for lLs loans or to secure more low 
cost funding. 
- BRAC now has only Lwo sources of rundUng available Lo ]L-
donors and members, There is no let1al baai.s for BRAG t.o use 
the members' funds and the supply of donor mon~y In the long 
term is never secure, BRAC' s fut.ure ability t.o grow can not be 
cerLain unless Lt either diversiries iLs sources of fint•nce or 
becomes 1 egall y en Li 1:. led to use Lhe savj ngs of Lhe members, 
If BRAG seriously begins to addTess and im!Jrove its loan repayment 
record the last operational isstle which could impede the self-
sufficiency of RGP will be behind 1hnm. The rcm•lnlng issues with 
respect to long term viabi liLy fllcing llRAC llre basicnlly issues of 
financial sLrucLure and philosophy. 
DRAC needs to develop a clear structure for RCP Lhat Will protect 
to the full extent possible the borrowers and save.-s and th;~t ><ill 
have a diversity of funding SOUJ'Ces, 
There appears to be an opportuniL)' in the c urrent political and 
economjc environment:. lo create o private sector bank based on RCP. 
This is an opportunity which may not always be avail~ble. 
1'hc rev icwcrs 
sec lor bunk 
immediately: 
RecommPndntlon: 
Tecommend that BAAC proceed t.o creat.e a pr i val.e 
and l.hal t.hc follow-ing issues be explored 
- incorporaLion and approval process: The requirements ><ith 
respect to minimum capita lization, maximum debt./cquit.)' ratios, 
provisions, reserves, etc, wJ 1 t have Lo be sLud ied as wi 11 the 
process of obtaining governmental avproval t.o star-t up and 
operate a bank. The reporting req11ir-emenLs of a privaLe sector 
bank is an addit.ional issue which wlll ha.ve to be studied. 
equ_it.y: In order to incoq>oral.e a uanlt ORAC will need 
eqllity. Wil.lo respect. l.o Lhls Issue DRAC has several opLions: 
- a portion of the borrowers' savings could be converted 
Lo equily . 'l'hls may ue pol iLically an asLuLc move bul il 
1dll tlOL add much riruwcialiy or 111ana!,lerially, 
- all or a portion of l.he BRAC Loon could be co nverted 
wil.h l,he aPIH·oval or lhe donors into equity, 
- URAC could possiul.~· obtain some capital f1·om private 
investors within Bangladesh or from outs1de of lh<> 
country. 1'his option would dt?pend on the i nvest.men L 
climate 1n Bangladesh and ~he prospecls for profiLable 
ope1·ation but. would bring with it valuable outside 
professional participation in the management of the 
proposed bank. 
The source of fut.llre equity is also tied to the issue of 
ownership and control of Lhe proposed bank. 1'his is a crit1cal 
issue that will require n great deal of discussio11, inLernally 
and with the existing donor 11roup as well as W'it.h future 
potential investors and represenLULlve groups of members. 
- savings : BRAC should consider replacing savings as a major 
soltrce of t'unds unless i L can charge more for its loans. 
Paying 9% p.a. orl deposll.s is ve r y expensive. If ORAC decides 
no L to use t.h... memb!S'rs' funds in RCP these deposits could 
instead be managed by BRAC and l nvested ~o create a "future 
fund '' for Lhe m~mbers. This solulion lf applied wlthln ROP and 
RCP would answer Lhe donors' concerns wi Lh respect Lo Lhe 
securlly of Lhe members' funds . 
- debt: If BRAC determines thaL sa,· ings sbouJ.d nol form Lhe 
major pari. of Lhe loan funding l.hen l.here is a need for more 
debL Lo fill LhaL role. DRAC should invesLl~ate olher sources 
oi funding including t.he World Bank funds available Lhrough 
Lhe recently created credi L development. foundation and the 
Bank of Bangladesh. These funds are pot.enLiaUy available at 
2% and 6%. p.a. Some of the 8RAC loan could become a real debL 
also earning BRAC some inLerest income. 
- loanu raLes: lf BRAC becomes a priv•te sector bank 1t should 
try to charge what tt needs to earn a reasonab~e prof1t. This 
rale will be ~realer than 16% p . a. 
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